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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Corporations-PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL-Manufacturers Build-

ing, Inc. v. Heller, -

Minn. -,

235 N.W.2d 825 (1975).

In the recent case of Manufacturers Building, Inc. v. Heller,' the
Minnesota Supreme Court pierced a corporate veil, but failed to elucidate clearly the theory that justified its decision, thereby creating possible confusion in the Minnesota law on disregard of corporateness. After
disregarding the corporate entity, the court held that the corporation
would be treated as a partnership; that the partners owned the partnership property, a building, as tenants in common; and that the defendant
did not breach his fiduciary duty owed to the partnership and his fellow
partners. This comment will explore the basis the court used to disregard the corporate entity of Manufacturers Building, Inc., and thereafter will examine the partnership law the court applied upon that disregard.
In Heller, four purchasers of a building created a de jure corporation
to manage the building. Defendant, Heller, who owned fifty percent of
the building corporation, controlled another corporation that was a tenant in the building. When his own business suffered severe financial
difficulties, defendant failed to pay rent to the plaintiff building corporation. After unlawful detainer proceedings were commenced to remove
defendant, he filed a petition under the Federal Bankruptcy Act2 and
thereby suspended the unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff-lessor corporation therefore faced the prospect of no rent for a year because of an
act of its own shareholder. Another shareholder in plaintiff corporation
commenced a shareholder derivative action against Heller, seeking to
hold him personally liable for the loss of rent. The trial court found that
the plaintiff corporation was acting merely as "an agent or conduit" for
the handling of accounts for the building, and the supreme court
agreed, 3 allowing the disregard of Manufacturers' corporate entity because it was "simply a convenient depository and conduit for rentals."'
While the Minnesota corporate disregard law is not entirely clear or
well-established, the court generally has pierced only in cases involving
, 235 N.W.2d 825 (1975).
1. Minn. 2. BANKRUPTCY AcT § 11, 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).

3. The court also affirmed the trial court's order for an accounting and award of damages on Heller's counterclaim against the other shareholders for half of the net profits of
the partnership business generated during the period the unlawful detainer action was
stayed.
4.

-

Minn. at

-

, 235 N.W.2d at 827.

5. Minnesota cases which discuss disregard of corporateness include: United States v.
Martin, 337 F.2d 171, 175 (8th Cir. 1964) (disregard allowable upon showing of no legitimate business purpose; disregard not granted); Hudson Minneapolis, Inc. v. Hudson
Motor Car Co., 124 F. Supp. 720, 723 (D. Minn. 1954) (court will ignore corporate fiction
when circumstances require, such as when it is used to justify wrong or perpetrate fraud;
disregard not granted); Inre Burntside Lodge, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 785, 787 (D. Minn. 1934)
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fraud.' In Heller, however, no fraud or other inequitable conduct affecting third parties was established.7 The court's decision to pierce was
based primarily on evidence that no corporate dividend had ever been
declared and that the corporation had filed at least one partnership
income tax return. However, Minnesota corporations generally are not
required to pay dividends8 and the only partnership income tax return
admitted into evidence was filed after the commencement of the litigation While this reliance on evidence of lack of some corporate formalities, without a showing of fraud, suggests a departure from existing
Minnesota corporate disregard law,"° Heller actually can be interpreted
(courts of equity will ignore corporate fiction when it is used as instrumentality to defeat
rights of creditors, justify wrong, or perpetrate fraud); Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259,
264, 143 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966) (single shareholder corporations are allowable and cannot
be disregarded on that basis); General Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 233 Minn. 345, 34950, 46 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1951) (courts will not allow corporate entity prevent judgment
otherwise required); Whitney v. Leighton, 225 Minn. 1, 8, 30 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1947) (in
absence of fraud corporation must be treated as separate legal entity from its shareholders); Central Motors & Supply Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467, 469, 18 N.W.2d 236, 237
(1945) (court may disregard corporate entity when it is dominated and controlled by
individual who made use of corporate entity to conceal his property from his creditors);
Erickson-Hellekson-Vye Co. v. A. Wells Co., 217 Minn. 361, 381-82, 15 N.W.2d 162, 173
(1944) (dictum) (where individual owns all, or practically all, stock in corporation, corporation and individual will be regarded as one and the same if the equities so require); State
v. McBride, 215 Minn. 123, 130-31, 9 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1943) (corporation cannot be used
as shield from personal responsibility for unlawful criminal activity); In re Will of Clarke,
204 Minn. 574, 578, 284 N.W. 876, 878 (1939) (courts will not let interposition of corporate
entity prevent judgment otherwise required); Matchan v. Phoenix Land Inv. Co., 159
Minn. 132, 138, 198 N.W. 417, 420 (1924) (where individual has incorporated himself to
hinder, and if possible, defraud creditors, courts may disregard corporateness if necessary
to accomplish justice).
6. E.g., Whitney v. Leighton, 225 Minn. 1,8, 30 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1947); Central Motors
& Supply Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467, 469, 18 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1945); Matchan v.
Phoenix Land Inv. Co., 159 Minn. 132, 138, 198 N.W. 417, 420 (1924). But see In re Will
of Clarke, 204 Minn. 574, 578-79, 284 N.W. 876, 878 (1939) (courts technically never
disregard corporateness, but only consider presence of corporation as one factor in deciding whether individual should be held personally liable). The concept of fraud in disregard
law embodies both actual common-law fraud and other improper shareholder conduct
technically not meeting all the requirements of a fraud cause of action. See 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 44 (rev. perm. ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as W. FLrCHER] (actual or constructive fraud); Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505, 544 (1977) ("soft-core" fraud).
7. The court did discuss whether fraud was present, but only in conjunction with the
issue of whether Heller breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation. See - Minn. at
-,

235 N.W.2d at 827.

8. See, e.g., Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 117-18, 285 N.W. 809, 821
(1939).
9. Copies of income tax returns prior to 1966 (when litigation commenced) were not
available. See Brief for Appellants at 29-30. In 1967, a United States Partnership Return
of Income (Form 1065) was filed. See Brief for Respondent at 17.
10. See Whitney v. Leighton, 225 Minn. 1, 4-9, 30 N.W.2d 329, 331-33 (1947).
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as adding a new dimension to the doctrine because of the absence of
third party involvement. In Heller, the defendant was not a third party
creditor, but rather was an insider of the plaintiff corporation. Although
not expressed by the Heller court, this distinction provides the justification for its withdrawal from the fraud or improper conduct bases of
earlier decisions. A little-used disregard theory, which has been termed
the "internal dealings" rule," has been applied by some courts in cases
where the dispute is between individual shareholders of a close corporation where the interests of third parties are not involved.2 In such cases,
the courts have ignored the existence of the corporate entity and have
treated the shareholders as partners."3 The rationale of the internal dealings rule apparently is that, as against third parties, shareholders of a
close corporation are allowed limited liability unless the corporate form
is used as an instrument for fraud, but when the litigation is between
corporate insiders, who have failed to observe the formalities incident
to that form, it is not unreasonable for the courts to treat them as they
have treated themselves.'
At least one court in another jurisdiction has applied the internal
dealings rule to facts similar to those in Heller, holding that where
tenants in common of real estate create a corporation to manage the
common property with equal division of stock, the corporate form may
be disregarded in a controversy between them. 5 That same court, however, also required a clear demonstration that the rules of corporate
conduct had been violated." Under this holding, Heller can be justified
because some evidence was presented indicating that the corporate formalities were not strictly followed.
If Heller is viewed as an internal dealings case, the ease with which
the court pierced Manufacturers' corporate form then should not be
taken as precedent in cases involving third parties attempting to hold
shareholders liable for corporate debts. In such cases, the fraud basis
§ 46.
12. See, e.g., Urnest v. Forged Tooth Gear Co., 102 Ill. App. 2d 178, 186, 243 N.E.2d
596, 601 (1968) (where interests of third parties are not involved, corporate entity may be
disregarded to adjudicate what is in reality only dispute between individual members);
Siegel v. Ribak, 43 Misc. 2d 7, 13, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903, 908-09 (Sup. Ct. 1964). An earlier
Minnesota case, Walsh v. Mankato Oil Co., 201 Minn. 58, 275 N.W. 377 (1937), can be
viewed as having applied a type of internal dealings rule. In Walsh, the dispute was
between the sole shareholder and an employee who was promised corporate stock. The
court held that the agreement was between the two individuals and the corporate entity
could not be used to protect the defendant from personal liability.
13. See, e.g., In re Ostwald's Estate, 20 Misc. 2d 1001, 1007, 189 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sur.
Ct. 1959); Garner Paper Co. v. Tuscany, 264 S.W. 132, 135 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
14. See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 46.
15. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., 261 F. 15 (6th Cir. 1919), cert. denied,
251 U.S. 558 (1920).
16. Id. at 18.
11. See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6,
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expressed in prior Minnesota cases is probably still applicable. The
internal dealings rule, however, is a liberal expansion of the disregard
doctrine" and therefore its use should be limited to cases where the facts
demonstrate clearly that corporate formalities have not been observed
and the rights of third parties are not at issue.
The balance of the court's opinion in Heller dealt with partnership
asset ownership and the fiduciary duties of partners. When the corporate entity was dissolved, the court stated that "[tihe practical effect
of their relationship was to make them partners and tenants in common
of the building."'" While the general rule is that a partnership relationship is created upon the successful disregard of a corporate entity, 9 the
court's statement cannot be read to suggest that partners hold partnership realty as tenants in common. Under the Uniform Partnership Act,
when a partnership owns property, the partners own the property as
tenants in partnership,"0 not as tenants in common,2' and their rights in
the property are defined by the Act. However, in Heller, although not
stated in the court's opinion, Manufacturers did not own the realty but
was formed only to manage it, and therefore it was not partnership
property. Prior to the organization of Manufacturers, the shareholders
had purchased the property personally and owned it as tenants in common.22 Consequently, Heller is not in conflict with the Uniform Partnership Act rule concerning tenancy in partnership.
The court also found that Heller had a right to petition for bankruptcy, despite his fiduciary duties to his fellow partners." A fiduciary
17. See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 46 (under this rule, entity can be disregarded
more readily than under other disregard theories).
18. Minn. at , 235 N.W.2d at 827.
19. See, e.g., Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1935). See
generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 147 (2d ed. 1970). Similarly, it is uniformly held that if the corporation fails
to achieve de facto status, the associates are treated as partners. E.g., Finnegan v. Noerenberg, 52 Minn. 239, 243-44, 53 N.W. 1150, 1151 (1893). See generally Carpenter, Are the
Members of a Defectively Organized CorporationLiable as Partners?,8 MINN. L. REv. 409
(1924).
20. See MINN. STAT. § 323.24 (1976).
21. E.g., Kraus v. Kraus, 250 N.Y. 63, 67, 164 N.E. 743, 744 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)
("plaintiff was not tenant in common, but 'tenant in partnership' "). See generally Comment, PartnershipRealty and Its Treatment Under the Uniform PartnershipAct, 19 MD.
L. REv. 141 (1959).
22. See Brief for Respondent at 3; Brief for Appellants at 4. But see Minn. at -'
235 N.W.2d at 826 ("four purchasers formed a corporation ... to take title to the Ressler
Building").
23. Minn. at -, 235 N.W.2d at 827. This finding makes the court's decision to
pierce the corporate veil troublesome. Because the fiduciary duties owed by corporate
officers are similar, and in most cases identical, to those owed by partners, compare
Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 277, 282-83, 156 N.W. 255,
257 (1916) (corporate fiduciary duties) with Lipinski v. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 518, 35
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obligation which imposes a duty of care, loyalty, good faith, and full
disclosure clearly attaches to the partnership relationship.2 ' The latter
duty requires full and frank disclosure of all matters affecting the partnership entity, 5 and it presumably was satisfied in this case because
Heller discovered financial difficulties in April and notified his copartners of that fact in May.26 In addition, Heller was entitled to do business
with the firm and the trial court found no evidence indicating a breach
of trust, fraud, or misconduct.? Consequently, Heller apparently did act
in good faith and at arm's length and therefore could properly bring the
bankruptcy action without breaching his duties to the partnership or his
fellow shareholder-partners.
Domestic Relations-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-Gorder v. Sims,
Minn. -,
237 N.W.2d 67 (1975).
Some call it legalized "blackmail";' others find it to be an anachronism in contemporary society;2 still others believe it prevents intrusion
into the "special relationship which exists between a husband and
wife." 3 This last view describes the recent posture of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in affirming a $20,000 jury award for the tort of alienation of affections in Gorder v. Sims.' The court, by its dual acts of
affirming a substantial jury award of damages and possibly lessening
the proof required to establish the tort, has ripened this cause of action
for renewed legislative attack.
In Gorder, a husband sued for the loss of his wife's affections which
N.W.2d 708, 712 (1949) (partnership fiduciary duties), the Hellercourt could have reached
the conclusion that the defendant did not breach his fiduciary duty without piercing the
corporate veil.
24. See Lipinski v. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 518, 35 N.W.2d 708, 712 (1949); Bloom v.
Lofgren, 64 Minn. 1, 2, 65 N.W. 960, 961 (1896). See generally Note, FiduciaryDuties of
Partners, 48 IOWA L. REv. 902 (1963).
25. See, e.g., Crawford v. Lugoff, 175 Minn. 226, 228, 220 N.W. 822, 823 (1928). MINN.
STAT. § 323.19 (1976) requires full disclosure "on demand." However, because the law of
agency supplements the U.P.A., MINN. STAT. § 323.04 (1976), the disclosure requirement
is not restricted to demand. Accord, Alexander v. Sims, 220 Ark. 643, 651, 249 S.W.2d
832, 836 (1952) (each partner has right to know all that others know and each is required
to make full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge).
26.

-

Minn. at

-,

235 N.W.2d at 826.

27. Id.
1. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 68, § 34 (Smith-Hurd 1959) ("action for alienation of
affections has been subjected to grave abuses and has been used as an instrument for
blackmail by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment").
2. See, e.g., Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 176-78, 115 So. 447, 450 (1928) (court
refused to recognize alienation of affections as a cause of action); Wyman v. Wallace, 15
Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976) (per curiam) (judicial abolition of the tort).
3. See Gorder v. Sims, Minn. , 4.
- Minn. , 237 N.W.2d 67 (1975).
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